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JONATHAN SUGAM: Phasic nucleus accumbens dopamine encodes  
risk-based decision making behavior 
(Under the direction of Regina M. Carelli) 
When deciding to act organisms must correctly evaluate the costs and benefits of 
action selection in order to optimize resources. Several factors influence the evaluation of 
reward value including the behavioral cost, the delay to, probability of, and magnitude of 
reinforcement. Dopamine (DA) transmission within the nucleus accumbens (NAc) has been 
implicated in reward learning and value-based decision making. The mesolimbic DA system 
has been shown to encode information about explicit value associated with behavioral 
performance that biases responses towards the most valuable options available; however it is 
unclear whether subjective value associated with risk-taking behavior is encoded by DA 
release. Here, phasic DA release in the NAc was monitored using fast scan cyclic 
voltammetry during a risk-based decision making task in which visual cues predicted the 
opportunity to respond for small certain or larger uncertain rewards. Reward predictive cues 
evoked increases in DA concentration in the NAc core that scaled with each animal’s 
preferred reward contingency. Further, DA signaling in the NAc core tracked the unexpected 
presentation or omission of rewards following prediction error theory. Similar processing 
was not observed in the NAc shell.  These results suggest that the dopaminergic projections 
to the NAc core encode the subjective value of future rewards that may function to optimize 
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 The ability to learn associations between cues and positive outcomes allows an 
organism to locate and secure resources for survival such as food, shelter, and mates. In order 
to appropriately seek and secure necessary resources, organisms must learn to evaluate the 
costs and benefits of performing a behavior to determine the best option to maximize their 
behavioral output (Green and Myerson 2004; Cardinal 2006; Phillips, Walton et al. 2007; 
Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). When making these decisions the expected value of performing 
a task is a key component that biases responses towards the more valuable option available 
(Phillips, Walton et al. 2007; Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). Reward value is thus a critical 
factor that mediates normal decision making behaviors while aberrations in reward valuation 
processes result in maladaptive behaviors such as drug addiction. For example, drug 
addiction has been described as an aberrant learning process that is associated with risk-
taking behavior and poor decision making (Jentsch and Taylor 1999; Robbins and Everitt 
1999). Thus, understanding value-based decision making could help further understand a 
variety of normal and abnormal human activities, including drug taking, food seeking, social 
attachment, and sexual behavior. 
The nucleus accumbens and goal-directed behavior 
 The ability to form and use the associations between cues and positive outcomes to 
drive goal-directed behavior requires brain circuitry that can integrate sensory information 
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and motivational information to mediate motor output. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is a 
structure that is uniquely situated to allow for this processing and is implicated in the 
mediation of goal-directed behaviors (Kelley 2004). The NAc is part a larger corticolimbic 
reward circuit that receives glutamatergic input from the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), basolateral amygdala (BLA) and a dense dopaminergic input from the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA). These structures and associated projections to the NAc provide 
reward related information which functions to influence goal-directed behaviors. The NAc 
integrates this information and impacts behavior through its connections with motor-related 
regions (e.g., ventral pallidum). This connectivity supports the role of the NAc as a ‘limbic 
motor interface’ that enables the execution of motivated behaviors (Mogenson, Jones et al. 
1980). In support of its role in the mediation of goal-directed behaviors, in vivo 
electrophysiological and electrochemical techniques have demonstrated that cellular activity 
(Carelli, King et al. 1993; Carelli and Deadwyler 1994; Carelli 2000; Nicola, Yun et al. 2004; 
Roitman, Wheeler et al. 2005) and phasic dopamine (DA) release (Phillips, Stuber et al. 
2003; Roitman, Stuber et al. 2004) in the NAc are activated during behavioral events 
associated with obtaining and consuming food and drug rewards. Further, pharmacological 
and lesion studies have demonstrated that the NAc plays a critical role in both the appetitive 
and consummatory phases of goal-directed actions (Berridge and Robinson 1998; Stratford 
and Kelley 1999; Kelley 2004; Nicola, Taha et al. 2005), suggesting a critical role for the 
NAc in motivated behaviors. 
Associative learning properties of nucleus accumbens activity and dopamine signaling 
The NAc and its dopaminergic input from the VTA have been shown to be critical for 
learning association between cues and positive outcomes which promotes goal-directed 
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behavior (Berridge and Robinson 1998; Nicola, Yun et al. 2004; Nicola, Taha et al. 2005; 
Day, Wheeler et al. 2006; Day, Roitman et al. 2007; Hollander and Carelli 2007). 
Mesolimbic DA neurons show increased phasic activity to reward paired cues and encode 
violations in prediction following reward paired cues (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997; Schultz 
1998; Waelti, Dickinson et al. 2001). These DA neurons project to the NAc, as it has been 
shown that phasic DA release in the NAc encodes associations between cues and outcomes 
(Day, Roitman et al. 2007; Stuber, Klanker et al. 2008), and is essential for stimulus-outcome 
learning (Sombers, Beyene et al. 2009; Zellner, Kest et al. 2009). As the mesolimbic DA 
system is a neuromodulator of NAc activity (Yun, Wakabayashi et al. 2004; Goto and Grace 
2005), NAc neurons also display increased and/or decreased cell firing to cues that predict 
future rewards (Carelli 2000; Carelli 2004; Nicola, Yun et al. 2004; Roitman, Wheeler et al. 
2005; Day, Wheeler et al. 2006; Jones, Day et al. 2010). 
The mesolimbic DA circuitry and associated NAc neural responses are critical in 
encoding specific characteristics of reward associations that biases future actions. For 
example, NAc neurons exhibit differential activity for drug versus natural rewards (Carelli, 
Ijames et al. 2000) and for appetitive versus aversive outcomes (Roitman, Wheeler et al. 
2005). Further, ventral striatal neurons display differential activity to cue presentation based 
on the value of future outcomes (Schultz, Apicella et al. 1992; Cromwell and Schultz 2003; 
Kim, Sul et al. 2009). Mesolimbic DA neurons also display increased activity for cues that 
predict rewards based on magnitude, delay (Roesch, Calu et al. 2007), probability (Fiorillo, 
Tobler et al. 2003), and expected value (Tobler, Fiorillo et al. 2005), implicating a critical 




Modeling value-based decision making 
Rarely in the environment do organisms encounter situations in which simple 
stimulus-outcome associations are in effect, and thus organisms must learn to evaluate the 
risks and benefits of action performance when making decisions to maximize their behavioral 
output (Green and Myerson 2004; Cardinal 2006; Phillips, Walton et al. 2007; Rangel, 
Camerer et al. 2008). To do this, organisms formulate representations of potential courses of 
action as well as the internal and external states at the time of action. The costs and benefits 
of behavior based on these representations are evaluated and an action is selected.  Once the 
action is performed the organisms compares the value of the outcome with the previous 
representations to update learning about the given situation (Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). 
This type of value-based decision making can be modeled in humans and animals by 
exposing organisms to situations in which there is a choice between rewards of different 
value. For example, humans (Coffey, Gudleski et al. 2003; Green and Myerson 2004; Hariri, 
Brown et al. 2006; Prévost, Pessiglione et al. 2010) and animals (Cardinal, Pennicott et al. 
2001; Roesch, Calu et al. 2007; Roesch, Singh et al. 2009; Day, Jones et al. 2010) show 
similar patterns of choice behavior based on the time the organism spends waiting for the 
reward. In these choice tasks, subjects are presented with smaller rewards presented sooner 
and larger rewards presented later and reward value is discounted by the time to 
reinforcement. Animals and humans show similar patterns of behavior, choosing the larger 
option less often as the delay to reward increases. Similar patterns of discounting are also 
seen when organisms must choose between rewards based on the cost of behavior (i.e. the 
effort required to obtain reinforcement (Floresco and Whelan 2009; Day 2010; Day, Jones et 
al. 2010; Gan, Walton et al. 2010; Prévost, Pessiglione et al. 2010)).  
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Risky decision making is a third type of value-based decision making which is 
impaired in several psychiatric disorders including gambling and drug addiction (Crews and 
Boettiger 2009). Risky decisions have been modeled in humans and animals using gambling 
paradigms in which organisms are given choices between “playing it safe” for a smaller 
reward delivered 100% of the time or “taking a risk” for a larger reward delivered with less 
certainty. Within this framework, organisms evaluate expected reward value that can be 
modeled with simple economic utility theory. One such metric, termed “reward value”, can 
be calculated by multiplying the explicit reward magnitude by the probability of reward 
delivery (Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). For example, if a rat is expecting to get 2 sucrose 
pellets 50% of the time for performing a specific behavior, the expected value or net utility of 
the behavior is 1 sucrose pellet (2 x 0.5 = 1). Following this logic, organisms can optimize 
choices by picking responses with the highest expected value. However, in some cases 
animals will be presented with situations in which they can choose between one or more 
options and the expected value of either performance is equal (e.g., rats are given a choice 
between 1 sucrose pellet 100% of the time versus 2 sucrose pellets 50% of the time). In these 
situations, the internal preferences about risk-taking and reward probability and magnitude 
determine the subjective value that organisms associate with the different options (Kable and 
Glimcher 2007). This is opposed to the objective or explicit reward value that is associated 
with the characteristics of the reinforcer itself (e.g., 4 pellets is always more valuable than 1 
pellet). Animals display similar discounting to humans in that larger rewards are chosen less 
often as the probability of receiving the reward decreases (Green and Myerson 2004; 
Cardinal and Howes 2005; St Onge and Floresco 2008; Floresco and Whelan 2009; St. Onge, 
Chiu et al. 2010; St. Onge and Floresco 2010). Importantly, all value-based decision making 
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models incorporate situations in which organisms have choices between options that vary 
based on the different aspects of reward value. Both the explicit characteristics and subjective 
representations of reward value influence choices towards the most valuable options 
available. 
Value-based decision making and the mesolimbic dopamine system 
Recent research has employed several models of complex value-based decision 
making and has implicated the NAc and its afferent dopaminergic projections to the NAc in 
this behavior. Mesolimbic DA neurons encode information about reward value based on 
several factors including reward probability, delay, magnitude, and effort requirements to 
inform the organism of the value of options available (Fiorillo, Tobler et al. 2003; Tobler, 
Fiorillo et al. 2005; Roesch, Calu et al. 2007; Day, Jones et al. 2010). Therefore, 
perturbations in this system are expected to result in aberrant decision making. As such, 
lesions of the NAc induce risk-averse behaviors in a probabilistic reinforcement task 
(Cardinal and Howes 2005) and impulsive choices in a delay discounting task (Cardinal, 
Pennicott et al. 2001), even when these choices were less advantageous. Further, systemic 
administration of dopaminergic drugs alters risk-taking behavior and effortful decision 
making (St Onge and Floresco 2008; Floresco and Whelan 2009; St. Onge, Chiu et al. 2010) 
suggesting a role for the DA system in reward evaluation. Taken together, these results 
suggest that DA release in the terminal region of the NAc is critical in the mediation of 
appropriate decision making, and disruption of this circuitry is expected to alter decision 
making. For example, pharmacological disruption and 6-OHDA lesions of DA neurons in the 
NAc impairs the evaluation of costs associated with performing behaviors (Salamone, 
Wisniecki et al. 2001; Salamone, Salamone et al. 2002; Salamone, Correa et al. 2005; 
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Adriani, Boyer et al. 2009) while overexpression of the DA transporter in the NAc increases 
risk-taking behavior and impulsive choices. Recent evidence has also suggested that the 
mesolimbic DA projections (Roesch, Calu et al. 2007) and terminal DA release in the NAc 
(Day, Jones et al. 2010) encode the value of the options available during decision making 
tasks which functions to bias decisions towards the higher value options. 
While previous value-based decision making research has implicated the NAc and 
mesolimbic DA function in this behavior, phasic DA signaling in the NAc during risky 
decision making based on subjective value remains unclear. Here, we investigated the role of 
phasic DA signaling during risky decision making in which animals were given the option to 
choose between a smaller certain and larger uncertain reinforcer. Fast-scan cyclic 
voltammetry was employed to evaluate how phasic DA signaling in the NAc encodes 
information about reward value based on risk. Importantly, the expected value of each 
behavioral response in the task was equal such that across the training session animals 
received the same amount of reward for taking risks or playing it safe. Therefore, we were 






 Male Sprague Dawley rats (n = 8 animals with 11 recording locations for NAc core 
and n = 3 animals with 3 recording locations for NAc shell, Harlan Sprague Dawley, 
Indianapolis, IN) aged 90-120d and weighing 275-350g were used as subjects and 
individually housed with a 12:12 light:dark cycle. All experiments were conducted between 
9:00 am and 5:00 pm. Bodyweights were maintained at no less than 85% of pre-experimental 
levels by food restriction (10-15g of Purina laboratory chow each day, in addition to 
approximately 1g of sucrose consumed during daily sessions). This regimen was in place for 
the duration of behavioral testing, except during the post-operative recovery period when 
food was given ad libitum. All procedures were approved by the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.  
 
Behavioral Training 
 Behavioral training and recording sessions were conducted in 43 X 43 X 53cm 
Plexiglas chambers housed in a sound-attenuated cubicle (Med Associates, St Albans, VT). 
One side of the chamber had 2 retractable levers (Coulbourn Instruments, Allentown, PA) 
located 17cm apart. A stimulus light was located 6cm above each lever. A speaker to deliver 
white noise (80db) was located 12cm above the floor on the opposite wall. A houselight 
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(100mA) was mounted 6cm above the speaker. Forty-five mg sucrose pellets were delivered 
to the food receptacle located equidistantly between the retractable levers. During training 
sessions 1-5, both levers were extended and both cue lights above each lever were 
illuminated. Responding on either lever was reinforced on a continuous schedule of 
reinforcement (fixed ratio 1, FR1) and resulted in the delivery of a 45mg sucrose pellet. A 
maximum of 100 reinforcers (50 reinforcers per lever) were available. Next, training on the 
risky decision making task began (see figure 1a for schematic of task and figure 1b for 
session timeline). During the first 10 sessions rats were trained in a task that involved 3 types 
of contingencies (30 trials each) intermixed within 90 total trials per session. At this stage of 
training, only safe options were available to train rats to press each lever (i.e., risk trials were 
not included). The first two trial types were classified as forced-choice trials. For one trial 
type, a single cue light was illuminated for 5s over one lever followed by extension of both 
levers. Responses on the lever under the illuminated cue light within 15s were reinforced 
with 1 sucrose pellet. During the other forced-choice trial type, the other cue light over the 
second lever was illuminated (5s), followed by extension of both levers and responses (15s) 
on the corresponding lever were reinforced as above. Responses on the unsignaled lever were 
counted as “errors” and resulted in the houselight being extinguished for the remainder of the 
trial period and the absence of reward delivery. During the third trial type (termed free-
choice trials), both cue lights were illuminated (5s), both levers were extended, and responses 
on either lever (15s) were reinforced with a single food pellet. Following each lever press 
during any trial type, the levers were retracted and rewards were immediately delivered. 
Thus, during the first 10 training sessions the reward contingencies for each option were 
identical (FR1 schedule of reinforcement for one 45mg sucrose pellet). This was done to 
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allow animals to fully learn the predictive associations of the cue lights before the reward 
contingencies were altered. Furthermore, this ensured that there would be no bias in response 
allocation as a result of differential learning between the two levers.  
Following acquisition of sessions 1-10, the reward contingency on one of the levers 
(counterbalanced across animals) was altered to reflect the risky decision making task. As 
shown in Figure 1a, on forced-choice safe trials (top) a cue light was illuminated for 5 s 
followed by extension of both levers into the chamber. A response on the lever situated under 
that cuelight resulted in one 45mg sucrose pellet delivered 100% of the time to a centrally 
located foodcup. Responses on the other lever were counted as errors, not rewarded, 
terminated the houselight, and ended the trial. On forced-choice risk trials (figure 1a, middle) 
the other cue light was presented for 5 s before extension of the lever beneath it. A response 
on that lever resulted in 2 sucrose pellets delivered 50% of the time to the foodcup. 
Responses on the other lever were counted as errors as above. On free-choice trials (figure 
1a, bottom) both cue lights were illuminated and rats could select either option. As such, 
presses on the “safe lever” during forced- and free-choice trials resulted in the delivery of 
one 45 mg sucrose pellet 100% of the time. Presses on the “risk lever” during forced- and 
free-choice trials resulted in the delivery of two 45 mg sucrose pellets 50% of the time. 
Several other studies have used similar reward contingencies in which animals choose 
between smaller certain and larger uncertain rewards to model risk-taking behavior (Cardinal 
and Howes 2005; St Onge and Floresco 2008; Floresco and Whelan 2009; Roitman and 
Roitman 2010). Using this reinforcement contingency the expected value of each lever was 
equal such that presses on one lever were not more advantageous than presses on the other 
lever across the entire session. Animals were trained on the risky decision making task for an 
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 Following behavioral training rats were surgically prepared for voltammetric 
recordings as previously described (Phillips, Robinson et al. 2003). Animals were 
anesthetized with a ketamine hydrochloride (100mg/kg) and xylazine hydrochloride 
(10mg/kg) mixture (intramuscular) and placed in a stereotaxic frame. A guide cannula 
(Bioanalytical Systems, West Lafayette, IN) was positioned dorsally to the NAc core (1.3 
mm anterior, 1.3mm lateral from bregma). An Ag/AgCl reference electrode was placed 
contralateral to the stimulating electrode in the left forebrain. The bipolar stimulating 
electrode (Plastics 1 Inc., Roanoake, VA) was placed dorsally to the VTA (5.2 mm posterior, 
1.0 mm lateral from bregma and 7 mm ventral from dural surface). Stainless steel skull 
screws and dental cement were used to secure all items. A detachable micromanipulator 
containing a glass-sealed carbon-fiber electrode (75-100µm exposed tip length, 7µm 
diameter, T-650; Amoco, Greenville, SC) was inserted into the guide cannula and the 
electrode lowered into the NAc. The bipolar stimulating electrode was lowered in 0.2 mm 
increments until electrically evoked DA release was detected at the carbon-fiber electrode in 
response to an electrical stimulation train (60 biphasic pulses, 60Hz, 120µA, 2 ms per phase). 
The stimulating electrode was then fixed with dental cement and the carbon-fiber electrode 
was removed.  
 
Fast-scan cyclic voltammetry 
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 Following surgery, animals were allowed to recover to presurgery body weight for 
one week. Food restriction was resumed to increase motivation during behavioral 
performance. Animals were retrained on the behavioral task for 4 sessions or until they 
reached presurgery levels of performance. DA concentration changes during behavior were 
assessed using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry as previously described (Day, Roitman et al. 
2007). A new carbon-fiber electrode, housed in the micromanipulator, was lowered into the 
NAc core or shell and was used to measure DA changes during task performance. The 
potential of the carbon-fiber electrode was held at -0.4V versus the Ag/AgCl reference 
electrode. Voltammetric recordings were made every 100 ms by applying a triangular 
waveform that drove the potential to +1.3V and back to -0.4V at a scan rate of 400V/s. 
Application of the triangular waveform results in the oxidation and reduction of chemical 
species that are electroactive within this potential range (including DA), producing a 
measurable change in current at the carbon-fiber. Following equilibration in the brain 
(typically 20-30 minutes to reduce current drift at the electrode), DA release was electrically 
evoked by stimulating the VTA using a range of stimulation parameters (2-24 biphasic 
pulses, 20-60 Hz, 120µA, 2 ms per phase) to make sure that the carbon fiber electrode was 
placed close to DA release sites and to create a training set for principal component analysis. 
Animals then underwent task performance and electrochemical recordings were made 
continuously with 100 ms temporal resolution. Following termination of the behavioral 
session, VTA stimulation was repeated to verify the stability of the electrode and ensure that 
the location of the electrode still supported DA release. 
 
Signal identification and separation 
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 Stimulation of the VTA leads to two well-characterized electrochemical events: an 
immediate but transient increase in DA and a delayed but longer lasting basic pH shift. To 
separate these signals a training set was constructed from representative, background-
subtracted cyclic voltammograms for DA and pH, as previously described (Heien, Khan et al. 
2005). The background period (500msec) was obtained at the minima for the DA signal 5 sec 
before event onset. This training set was used to perform principal component regression on 
data collected during the behavioral session. Principal components were selected such that at 
least 99% of the variance in the training set was accounted for by the model. All data 
presented here fit the resulting model at the 95% confidence level. After use, carbon-fiber 
electrodes were calibrated in a solution of known DA to convert observed changes in current 
to differential concentrations. 
 
Data analysis  
 All behavioral events (cue onset and offset, lever extension and retraction, lever 
presses and reward delivery) and electrochemical measurements were recorded. The number 
of errors and reward pellets received were evaluated using a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA with Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test. Response allocation on choice trials were 
calculated as 3 day averages of lever press behavior on free-choice trials (final two training 
sessions and the recording session or the final three training sessions before switching the 
reward contingencies). Animals were required to have at least 60% responses on the 
preferred lever during the recording session to be included in the data analysis. Using this 
criteria, 7 animals with 10 recording locations were included in the behavioral and 
electrochemical data analysis. Behavioral preferences were compared using an unpaired two-
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tailed t-test to compare responses to chance level and paired two-tailed t-tests to compare 
preferred versus nonpreferred responses. Response latencies during the recording session 
were calculated by taking the average latency to lever press during forced-choice trials on the 
preferred and nonpreferred lever. Trials in which the response latency was greater than 10 
seconds were excluded from analysis. The average response latencies were compared using a 
paired two-tailed t-test. 
 Phasic changes in extracellular DA concentration during the task were assessed by 
aligning DA concentration traces to relevant behavioral events (specifically cue presentation 
and lever extension). Group increases or decreases in NAc DA concentration from baseline 
in response to cue presentation were evaluated separately for each trial type (preferred, 
nonpreferred, and choice) using a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with Dunnett’s 
correction for multiple comparisons. This analysis compared the baseline mean DA 
concentration to each data point (100msec bin) obtained within 2s following the cue 
presentation. The baseline DA concentration was the average DA concentration for 5s prior 
to cue onset for each animal.  
In order to determine the relationship between cue evoked DA release and lever press 
behavior a correlation analysis was performed. The correlation between DA release in the 
NAc core and lever press behavior was performed by taking the ratio of the peak DA 
concentration within 2s of cue presentation for the risk and safe cues compared to the ratio of 
risk versus safe lever presses on free-choice trials. The ratio of DA signaling was calculated 
by taking the peak DA for the risk cue and dividing it by the total peak DA for the risk and 
safe cue presentation. The ratio for lever pressing was calculated by taking the total number 
of presses on the risk lever during free-choice trials and dividing by the total number of 
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presses during free-choice trials (sum of presses on the risk and safe lever). All animals were 
used for this analysis including the animal that did not display a behavioral preference. To 
assess the differential effects of the three cue types (preferred, nonpreferred, and choice) on 
DA release, the peak DA concentrations within 2 s following cue presentation were analyzed. 
The effects of the three cue types were evaluated using repeated measures ANOVA with 
Tukey’s post-hoc tests. Comparisons were performed separately for data collected in the 
NAc core and shell. For comparison of DA signal on free-choice trials when animals pressed 
the preferred versus nonpreferred lever, one animal that never selected the nonpreferred 
option was removed to allow for proper statistical comparison and to ensure that results were 
not biased. Peak DA release during choice trials when the animal chose the preferred versus 
nonpreferred option were evaluated using a paired t-test. In order to confirm that the effect 
was not a result of an uneven number of trials, peak DA release during free-choice trials was 
also evaluated using a paired t-test in which trials that the rat pressed the preferred lever were 
randomly chosen to allow for equal number of preferred and nonpreferred trials. DA 
concentration during reward delivery was evaluated by examining the peak DA concentration 
within 2 seconds following lever extension for rewarded risk and safe trials and the lowest 
point within 2 seconds following lever extension for unrewarded risk trials. Again, data were 
evaluated using a repeated measures ANOVA with Tukey’s post-hoc tests. All analysis were 
considered significant at α=0.05. Statistical and graphical analysis were performed using 
GraphPad Prism 4.0 for Windows (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA), STATISTICA for 
Windows (StatSoft Inc. Tulsa OK) and Neuroexplorer for Windows version 4.034 (Plexon 





 Upon completion of the experiment, rats were deeply anesthetized with a 
ketamine/xylazine mixture (100 mg/kg and 10 mg/kg, respectively). To mark the placement 
of the electrode tip, a 150 to 250 µA current was passed through a stainless steel electrode for 
5 seconds using established procedures (Roitman, Stuber et al. 2004; Day, Roitman et al. 
2007). Animals were decapitated and brains were removed and postfixed in 10% formalin. 
After postfixing and freezing, 40 µm coronal brain sections were mounted on microscope 
slides. The specific position of electrodes was assessed by visual examination of successive 
coronal sections in comparison to visual landmarks and anatomical organization of the NAc 
represented in a stereotaxic atlas (Paxinos 2005). For the NAc core, multiple recordings in 3 
animals were completed during different behavioral sessions in which the electrode was 




Behavioral performance on risky decision making task 
 Animals rapidly acquired the lever press response, performing maximal responding 
and consuming all rewards by the fifth pretraining session. Following pretraining, rats were 
able to learn the risky decision making task and discriminate between the cue types as 
evidenced by a significant reduction in the percentage of errors on forced safe or risk trials 
compared to session 1 (F(24,144) = 6.244, P < 0.0001; figure 2a). On the final training session 
before voltammetry surgery animals averaged 0.5714 ± 0.7868 errors during the session. 
Furthermore, over the final 7 days of behavioral training, the number of errors was not 
significantly greater than 0. Concurrent with the reduction in errors, animals displayed a 
significant increase in the number of sucrose pellets received across all sessions compared to 
session 1 (F(24,144) = 3.092, P< 0.0001; figure 2b). Taken together, these data show that 
behavioral performance improved with training such that by the recording session animals 
were performing the task optimally.  
 Response allocation on free-choice trials was evaluated to determine the behavioral 
preference of animals as they performed the risky decision making task. On free-choice trials 
animals displayed a significant preference for one contingency (safe or risky). Collapsed 
across contingency type (safe or risky), animals exhibited significantly greater presses on the 
preferred lever compared to the nonpreferred lever (t (9) = 6.426, P = 0.001) and pressed the 
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preferred lever significantly more than chance (t (9) = 6.426, P = 0.001; figure 2c). (One 
animal recorded in the NAc core did not display a behavioral preference during the recording 
session and thus is only included in the correlation analysis). Animals also showed a 
nonsignificant trend towards faster latency to press the preferred lever on forced choice trials 
during the recording session (t (9) = 1.833, P = 0.1; figure 2d). The preference data suggest 
that individual differences in risk-prone and risk-averse behaviors developed as the animals 
learned the task since lever preference was not observed early in training (t (6) =1.089, P > 
0.05, data not shown). Similar behavioral data were obtained for animals with recordings in 
the NAc shell. Specifically, those animals exhibited significantly more presses on the 
preferred versus nonpreferred lever (t (2) = 8.362, P = 0.0140) and pressed the preferred 
lever significantly faster than the nonpreferred lever (t (2) = 5.094, P =0.0364 (figure 8a, b). 
 
Reward-associated discriminative stimuli evoke phasic dopamine signals in the nucleus 
accumbens 
 The design of this task allowed us to investigate changes in NAc DA during the 
presentation of reward predictive cues and the delivery of expected and unexpected rewards. 
Consistent with previous reports reward-predictive cues in all trial types evoked the strongest 
increase in phasic DA release in both the NAc core (Stuber, Klanker et al. 2008; Day, Jones 
et al. 2010; Gan, Walton et al. 2010) and shell (Day, Jones et al. 2010) (see figure 7 for 
histological verification of electrode placements in the NAc core and shell). Representative 
single trial changes in DA concentration occurring during task performance are shown for 
two animals in figure 3a and figure 4a. The strongest increases in DA were typically 
observed following cue presentation during all three trial types for both risk-averse (figure 
19 
 
3a) and risk-prone (figure 4a) animals. A second lower concentration increase in DA was 
also observed during the reward delivery period. Figure 3b and 4b shows individual trial data 
as well as average changes in DA concentration for a risk-averse (figure 3b) and risk-prone 
(figure 4b) animal during the entire behavioral session. This demonstrates that throughout the 
training session cue presentations and reward deliveries evoked phasic increases in NAc DA 
concentration. In the next section, I examine how changes in DA reflect the preferred option 
of the animal (risk prone versus risk averse).  
Cue-evoked dopamine signals within the nucleus accumbens core reflect reward 
preferences 
Cue-selectivity in DA release was determined by comparing the peak DA release 
between the 3 trial types for each individual animal. On forced-choice trials, cue-evoked DA 
release in the NAc core tracked the subjective value of future rewards as DA signaling scaled 
with each animal’s individual preference. For example, figure 3 shows DA release dynamics 
during the task for a single risk-averse animal. Cue-evoked DA release was higher for cues 
predicting safe (center) compared to risk (left) trials. This animal preferred the safe option 
and DA release during free-choice trials (right) was similar to that observed during forced-
choice safe trials (center). Figure 4 shows a complementary pattern of DA concentration 
changes in a risk-prone animal, with larger increases in DA occurring for cues that predicted 
risky rewards. This pattern was conserved across all animals with recordings in the NAc 
core, as there was a significant correlation between the animal’s risk taking behavior and the 
differential DA release (r2 = 0.7118, P = 0.0011; figure 5). 
 Overall changes in DA concentration recorded at all locations in the NAc core for 
animals displaying a behavioral preference (n=7 animals with 10 recording locations) are 
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shown in figure 6a, aligned to cue onset. Specifically, cue onset occurred at time 0s and cue 
offset/lever presentation occurred at time 5s. Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that cue 
presentation in each trial type significantly increased DA concentration (Preferred: F(20,9) = 
16.72 P < 0.0001, Nonpreferred: F(20,9) = 28.39 P < 0.0001, Choice: F(20,9) = 24.69  P < 
0.0001). Further, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA comparing the peak DA evoked on 
each trial type (maximum DA concentration within 2s of cue onset) showed that the amount 
of cue-evoked DA release varied depending on the type of cue presented (F(2,9) = 9.479, P = 
0.0015; figure 6b). Post hoc analysis revealed a significant difference in DA concentration 
for forced-choice trials during the presentation of the preferred versus nonpreferred cue 
(Tukey’s post hoc test, P < 0.01; figure 6b). Further, during free-choice trials cue evoked DA 
release scaled to the preferred option. Specifically, peak DA concentration was similar for 
cues predicting the free-choice and preferred (P > 0.05; figure 6b) but not the nonpreferred 
option (P < 0.01, figure 6b). 
Cue–evoked DA could be functioning to signal the most valuable option available or 
the value of the option that is eventually chosen. In order to distinguish between these, DA 
release events were also quantified during free-choice trials when the animal chose the 
preferred versus nonpreferred option. This analysis revealed that DA signaling on free-choice 
trials encoded the most valuable option available rather than what the animal subsequently 
chose. Specifically, there was no significant differences in DA release in the NAc core on 
free-choice trials when animals chose the preferred versus nonpreferred option (t(8) = 
0.8858, P = 0.4015 for all choice trials and t(8) =2.089, P = 0.0701 when number of trials 
were equal). DA signals on free-choice nonpreferred trials were also not significantly 
different from cue-evoked DA release on forced-choice preferred trials (t(8) = 0.602, P = 
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0.5624), suggesting that the DA signal encodes information about the most valuable options 
available during decision making even when the nonpreferred option was chosen. Finally, 
value encoding of DA signaling was subregion specific as no significant differences were 
observed in peak DA concentrations across cue types in the NAc shell despite a strong 
behavioral preference (F(2,2) = 4.931, P = 0.0833; figure 8c and d). 
 
Dopamine signaling in the nucleus accumbens core tracks prediction errors during risky 
decision making 
It has been postulated by Schultz and colleagues that midbrain dopamine neurons 
encode information about stimulus-reward associations thus functioning as a learning signal 
(Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997).  In these models, dopamine cell firing (examined by 
electrophysiological recording of dopamine neurons) is believed to provide a ‘prediction 
error’ signal that compares expected outcomes with actual outcomes (Schultz, Dayan et al. 
1997).  Unexpected rewards produce brief synchronous bursts among dopamine neurons 
(termed positive prediction error) while fully predicted rewards typically evoke little or no 
phasic activity.  Further, if an expected reward is omitted, dopamine neurons exhibit a pause 
in cell firing, termed a negative prediction error (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997). 
The design of our behavioral task allows us to examine if DA release in the NAc core 
encodes prediction errors during risky decision making. To do this we evaluated DA release 
during a 2s period following lever presentation during forced-choice safe versus risk trials. 
The risk trials were separated into rewarded and unrewarded risk trials. Safe trials function as 
a situation in which rewards are perfectly predicted. Risk trials function as a situation where 
reward presentation and omission was unexpected. Figure 6c shows the timecourse of DA 
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release following lever extension in the NAc core. Unexpected reward delivery or omission 
during risk trials resulted in increases or decreases, respectively, in phasic DA concentration 
in the NAc core compared to perfectly predicted safe trials. Specifically, we observed a main 
effect of reward delivery on DA concentration (F(2,9) = 30.31, P < 0.0001; figure 6d). Post 
hoc tests revealed that during forced-choice risk trials, reward presentation resulted in a 
significant increase in DA concentration compared to forced-choice safe trials (Tukey’s post 
hoc test, P < 0.001; fig 6d).  Thus, when reward was presented, an increase in DA release 
was observed consistent with a positive prediction error (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997; Schultz 
1998). Conversely, the omission of reward during forced-choice risk trials resulted in 
significantly less DA release compared to forced-choice safe trials (P < 0.05; figure 6d), 
consistent with the signaling of a negative prediction error (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997; 




In the present study, DA release was measured in two subregions of the NAc while 
animals performed a risky decision making task. Importantly, the design of the task allowed 
us to assess how reward predictive cues associated with risky decisions affected patterns of 
DA release. We show that when given a choice animals develop individual preferences.  
They choose to either “play it safe” for a certain smaller reward, or to “take risks” for a 
larger, but uncertain reward. Reward predictive cues elicited an increase in DA 
concentrations in the NAc core that tracked individual preferences in the risky decision 
making task.  That is, cues that predicted the preferred reward contingency evoked higher 
DA release than cues that predicted the nonpreferred option.  
Further, the design of the experiment also allowed us to evaluate how DA release in 
the NAc core encodes information about the unexpected presentations and omissions of 
reward. As proposed by Schultz and colleagues (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997),violations in the 
expectation of reward result in errors in prediction which function as a teaching signal for the 
animal. This teaching signal thereby increases or decreases the prediction of future outcomes 
and is thus believed to be a neural substrate for learning (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997). Schultz 
and colleagues developed this model by examining the activity of mesolimbic dopamine 
neurons during electrophysiological recording techniques in awake, behaving monkeys. They 
showed that DA neurons in the VTA and substantia nigra encode a reward prediction error 
signal in which cues that predict rewards evoke phasic increases in firing rate while fully 
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expected rewards do not alter DA activity. Further, violations in these reward predictions 
alter DA activity, as unexpected reward delivery increases DA cell firing while unexpected 
reward omission decreases DA activity (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997). Results from the current 
study support the theory that DA neurons that project to the NAc encode prediction errors. 
Specifically, increases in DA concentration were observed in the NAc core for unexpected 
reward deliveries and decreases in DA concentration occurred during unexpected reward 
omissions (Figure 6). Since our laboratory has previously shown that rapid dopamine release 
in the NAc is a direct result of changes in burst firing of DA neurons (Sombers et al., 2009), 
our findings are consistent with the reward prediction model by Schultz and colleagues.  
Electrophysiological studies of DA cell firing show that cue-evoked DA signaling is 
sensitive to a number of features of upcoming reward such that cues which predict larger, 
immediate, or more probable rewards elicit larger spikes in DA neural activity than cues that 
predict smaller, delayed or less probable rewards (Fiorillo, Tobler et al. 2003; Tobler, Fiorillo 
et al. 2005; Roesch, Calu et al. 2007). This type of processing by DA neurons is hypothesized 
to be critical for decision making as it functions to broadcast information about reward value 
to striatal circuits that enable animals to maximize behaviors (Roesch, Calu et al. 2007; Day, 
Jones et al. 2010). Reward value is discounted by several “costs” including physical effort, 
time delays, probability, or aversive consequences, which animals must overcome to 
optimize choices (Phillips, Walton et al. 2007).  
Using this framework, value-based decision making can be explained through basic 
utility functions as a “cost-benefit analysis.” Thus animals must evaluate the behavioral costs 
that discount reward value to determine if a behavior is beneficial. In order to do this, 
animals have an intrinsic “threshold” for behavior such that options that fall below the “cost 
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threshold” are deemed worthwhile, while options that fall above the cost threshold are 
deemed not worthwhile and will be rejected. It has been hypothesized that value encoding by 
the DA system is used to monotonically set the “cost threshold” (or breakpoint) beyond 
which the net outcome is no longer worthwhile. With this model, phasic DA activity in the 
NAc core signals information about the value of future rewards, and if this prediction is 
below the cost threshold the behavior is deemed worthwhile and the animal will perform the 
task. Conversely, options that are predicted to have low value will evoke much less DA 
release, and thus this signal of future value will fall above the cost threshold and will be 
deemed not worthwhile (Phillips, Walton et al. 2007). 
 Based on this model, animals with a hyperactive DA system will be able to overcome 
higher costs of behavior to perform a given task better than control animals. Conversely a 
depleted DA system results in animals that are not able to overcome the cost expenditure to 
obtain rewards compared to controls. Empirical evidence has supported this model and has 
shown that DA depletion in the NAc core selectively retarded responding when the effort to 
obtain rewards increased (i.e. increased lever pressing). When response costs were low, 
control and DA depleted animals performed similarly as the value of the response was well 
below the cost threshold in both groups of animals. However, as response costs increased, 
dopamine depleted animals began to stop selecting the high cost reinforcer as the reward 
value was now above the depleted animals cost threshold while control animals were able to 
complete the task (Salamone, Wisniecki et al. 2001; Phillips, Walton et al. 2007).  
The “cost-benefit analysis” hypothesis of DA function has previously been used to 
explain if an animal will perform a given behavior based on the expected value of 
performance. However, this model can also be applied to a situation in which animals are 
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given concurrent choices with different values. Rather than serving as a threshold for 
performing a behavior or not, the DA system can be functioning to compare how two 
separate behaviors relate to the cost threshold and thus inform animals of which option is 
more worthwhile to guide choice behaviors. In support, evidence has shown that DA neural 
activity and terminal release encode information about the best available option when 
animals are given a concurrent choice of options with different explicit value, irrespective of 
what the animal actually chooses (Roesch, Calu et al. 2007; Day, Jones et al. 2010). The 
present data fit with this framework, as subjective value was encoded by the phasic DA 
release in the NAc core. Specifically, DA release on free-choice trials encoded the animals 
preferred, or most valuable, reward contingency even when the animal chose the less 
valuable option. Thus, DA release in the NAc core may play a key role in the evaluation of 
different responses and may thereby function to promote action selection.  
The mesolimbic DA system appears to provide information on the best available 
option to an organism, however animals do not always perform optimally. Therefore, other 
components of the corticolimbic reward circuitry, such as the PFC, BLA, or NAc core 
contribute to the promotion of appropriate behavior. For example, when subjects were 
presented with cues that predicted rewards of different value based on differing probability 
and magnitude, neural activity in these corticolimbic regions encoded different components 
of reward value. For example, activity in the ventral striatum encoded information about the 
expected value of future reward as there was more activity for higher probability and 
magnitude rewards (Tobler, O'Doherty et al. 2007). Further, when people were presented 
with rewards presented after varying delays, ventral striatum activity correlated with each 
individuals subjective value (Kable and Glimcher 2007). Similarly, cue-activated neurons in 
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the NAc encode the future action based on reward value, suggesting that the NAc may 
promote action selection based on subjective value (Samejima, Ueda et al. 2005; Roesch, 
Singh et al. 2009; Day, Jones et al. 2011). Conversely, PFC activity in humans (specifically 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) subregion) encoded information about reward uncertainty 
rather than expected value and action selection when presented with cues predicting 
reinforcers of differing probabilities and magnitudes. Further, the encoding of reward 
uncertainty was correlated with each individuals risk attitudes (Tobler, O'Doherty et al. 
2007). Similarly, OFC neural responses to reward delivery were correlated with individual 
differences in risk-taking behavior (Roitman and Roitman 2010) suggesting that the PFC 
encodes information about intrinsic attitudes that influence reward value to bias decisions. 
Finally, the BLA is a structure that is critical for maintaining the representation of future 
reward value during behavior which is essential for maintaining appropriate responding 
(Winstanley, Theobald et al. 2004).  
As such, each structure of the corticolimbic reward circuitry has a specific role in 
encoding reward value which mediates decision making, and thus damage to the different 
structures results in divergent impairments in risky decision making behavior. For example, 
inactivation of a subregion of the PFC disrupts risky decision making behavior, leading 
animals to become risk prone or risk averse, depending on which risk contingency the animal 
was first exposed to. This suggests animals were unable to update information on the changes 
in reward probability in each trial block to make appropriate choices (St. Onge and Floresco 
2010). Conversely, BLA inactivation affected decision making behavior by biasing animals 
towards safe options during risky decision making (Ghods-Sharifi, St. Onge et al. 2009) 
suggesting that animals could not maintain the representation of reward in its absence and 
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thus biasing animals away from risky choices. Finally, inactivation (Stopper and Floresco 
2011) or lesion (Cardinal and Howes 2005) of the NAc biased animals towards the safe 
option, even when this was less advantageous. These findings suggest that the NAc is critical 
for encoding expected value which promotes action selection. Collectively, these findings 
suggest that each neural substrate of this circuit play different roles in mediating appropriate 
decision making, and more specifically, the transfer of information between these structures 
and to the NAc is critical for risky decision making. As such, signaling from the PFC or BLA 
may override the value signaling of the mesolimbic DA system to bias responses towards a 
less valuable option which may explain why rats sometimes choose the nonpreferred lever 
(as shown here) or the less valuable option (Day, Jones et al. 2010; Day, Jones et al. 2011).  
Although all cues evoked DA release in both the core and shell of the NAc in the 
present study, DA transmission of value information was restricted to the NAc core. These 
results suggest that reward prediction is signaled in the NAc shell independently of reward 
valuation related to risky decision making behavior. Several lines of research have 
demonstrated that DA transmission in the NAc core and shell signal different aspects of 
future rewards, including the valence (appetitive versus aversive rewards), novelty, and value 
of rewards. Specifically, DA transmission in the NAc core has been shown to be an 
expression of motivational value and novelty of future rewards while DA transmission in the 
shell is an expression of reward valence (Corbit, Muir et al. 2001; Bassareo, De Luca et al. 
2002). Recent studies have demonstrated hedonic valence encoding in the NAc shell showing 
increases in DA release for a sweet sucrose solution and decreases in DA for a bitter quinine 
solution (Roitman, Wheeler et al. 2008). Consistent with this idea, damage to the core versus 
shell of the NAc has dissociable effects on value-based decision making. For example, 
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inactivation of the core, but not the shell, impairs the ability to overcome high response costs 
(Ghods-Sharifi and Floresco 2010) resulting in animals choosing low effort options more 
often than controls, while lesions of the NAc core and not the shell lead to increased 
impulsivity in several impulsive choice tests (Pothuizen, Jongen-Rêlo et al. 2005). Finally, 
lesions of the NAc core result in risk averse behaviors (even when this is the less 
advantageous behavior (Cardinal and Howes 2005)) while inactivation of the NAc shell 
alone produce much less robust risk averse behavior than inactivation of the NAc core and 
shell together (Stopper and Floresco 2011). Disruption of NAc shell activity did not have 
substantial effects on any value based decision making tasks, suggesting that the NAc core is 
critical for encoding reward value that mediates decisions. As such, valence based DA 
signaling in the shell is not expected to be different when cues are presented that predict the 
same reward with different values as was observed here and during an effort based decision 
making task (Day, Jones et al. 2010).  
The mesolimbic DA system is critical for adaptive reward seeking and decision 
making behavior, however it has also been implicated in maladaptive behaviors including 
drug addiction. Drug addiction involves the same circuitry as natural reward seeking and 
associative learning, as cues that are associated with drug taking also evoke phasic increases 
in DA in the NAc (Phillips, Stuber et al. 2003). A hallmark of drug addiction is increased 
risk-taking behavior and poor decision making (Jentsch and Taylor 1999; Robbins and 
Everitt 1999). As such, imbalances in the mesolimbic DA system may impair normal reward 
valuation processes and influence aberrant decision making behavior. For example, in rats 
that display trait impulsivity there is a significant reduction in dopamine D2/D3 receptor 
availability which is further correlated with subsequent increases in drug taking behavior 
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(Dalley, Fryer et al. 2007). Further, D2 receptor availability in the striatum is correlated with 
social dominance in male monkeys which is also related to cocaine intake. Specifically, 
subordinate monkeys show reduced D2 receptor availability compared to controls and also 
show increased drug taking behavior (Morgan, Grant et al. 2002). Alterations in the value 
encoding of mesolimbic DA system is a proposed mechanism of action which mediates 
aberrant decisions such as drug taking behavior (Schultz 2011). As discussed above, when 
cues become associated with natural rewards, NAc DA release in response to reward 
presentation decreases. However, addictive drugs produce changes in the mesolimbic DA 
neurons that result in increased excitability of these neurons to rewards and reward predictive 
cues (Jones and Bonci 2005). As such, it is hypothesized that drugs of abuse elicit increased 
DA release to both cues and rewards regardless of the prediction, thus always signaling a 
positive prediction error, or a reward that was better than predicted (Redish 2004; Schultz 
2011). In turn, this would result in a situation in which drug reinforcers are always increasing 
in predictive value biasing decisions in favor of drug seeking behavior (Redish 2004). The 
mesolimbic DA system therefore is critical for encoding reward value that mediates 
appropriate value-based decision making, however imbalances in this encoding may result in 
maladaptive decisions related, for example, to drug addiction. 
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Figure 1 (a) Schematic representation of risky decision making task. See methods for 
detailed description of task. After training, NAc DA was measured with fast-scan cyclic 
voltammetry during a single 90-trial behavioral session. (b) Experimental timeline. Animals 
received 20 total training sessions before surgical implantation of the guide cannula above 
the NAc (each circle = 1 session). During the first 10 sessions of training the reward 
contingency for both the safe and risk option were identical (both levers rewarded with one 
45 mg sucrose pellet 100% of the time) to ensure that animals learned the task without bias. 
During the next 10 sessions animals were trained as explained in (a). Following surgery 
animals were reexposed to the task and underwent at least 4 days of retraining or until they 
returned to presurgical behavior and DA was recorded a single test session. 
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Figure 2 Behavior on risky decision making task. (a) Task performance revealed a 
significant reduction in the number of errors across training session compared to session 1. 
By the end of training the number of errors was not significantly different from 0. (b) A 
significant increase was observed in the number of pellets received compared to session 1. 
By the end of training animals earned the maximum number of pellets possible. (c) Response 
allocation on free-choice trials averaged across the final two training sessions and the 
recording session. Dashed line represents indifference point. Each animal showed a 
significant preference for one of the reward (safe or risk) options. (d) Response latency for 
forced-choice trials during the recording session. Animals showed a nonsignificant trend 
towards a decreased response latency for the preferred versus nonpreferred lever. All data are 
mean ± SEM. * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.0001; # P = 0.1. 
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Figure 3 Representative electrochemical data during individual trials for a risk-averse 
animal. (a) (Top) Three-dimensional representation (time x voltage x current) of 
electrochemical data during a single forced-choice risk, forced-choice safe, and free-choice 
trial and the corresponding DA concentration trace (bottom). Signal is aligned to cue onset 
(time 0s) and cue offset/lever extension (time 5s; colored bars along x axis). Cues evoked 
differential DA release that was correlated with animal’s safe preference, evoking higher DA 
release for forced-choice safe and free-choice trials. (b) DA release averaged across all trials 
of the same type for the animal presented in (a). Heat plots (top) represent individual trial 
data ordered with first trial on top. Signal is aligned to cue onset (time 0s) and cue 
offset/lever extension (time 5s; colored bars along x axis). DA trace (bottom) represents the 
average DA for all trials of each type. Across the entire training session, cues evoked 
differential DA release that was correlated with the animal’s safe preference.
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Figure 4 Representative electrochemical data during individual behavioral trials for a risk-
prone animal. (a) Cue-evoked DA release for an individual forced-choice risk, forced-choice 
safe, and free-choice trial. Conventions follow figure 3a. Cues evoked differential DA release 
that was correlated with animal’s risk preference, evoking higher DA release for forced-
choice risk and free-choice trials. (b) Changes in DA across multiple trials for the animal 
presented in (a). Conventions follow figure 3b. Across the entire training session, cues 
evoked differential DA release that was correlated with the animal’s risk preference.
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Figure 5 DA signaling correlates with lever press behavior for risk versus safe options. The 
x-axis is lever press behavior during free choice trials showing the risk preference of each 
animal. The ratio of lever pressing was determined by dividing the number of presses on the 
risk lever during free-choice trials by the total number of presses on free-choice trials 
(Risk/(Risk+Safe)). A ratio greater than 0.5 suggests that an animal is risk-prone while a ratio 
of less than 0.5 suggests an animal is risk-averse. A ratio equaling 0.5 suggests that an animal 
has no preference. The y-axis is the ratio of DA signaling for forced-choice risk and forced-
choice safe trials. This ratio was calculated by taking the peak DA concentration within 2s of 
the cue presentation for risk and safe trials using the same formula as above 
(Risk/Risk+Safe). A ratio higher than 0.5 means that an animal had greater DA signaling 
during the risk cue compared to the safe cue while a ratio of less than 0.5 means that an 
animal had less DA signaling to the risk cue than the safe cue. A ratio of 0.5 means that DA 
signaling was equal across the two cue types. 
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 Figure 6 DA release in the NAc core encodes (a, b) subjective value and (c, d) prediction 
errors during the risky decision–making task. (a) DA concentration on forced–choice trials 
(separated by each animal’s behavioral preference) and free-choice trials aligned to cue onset 
(black bar, time 0s). (b) Peak cue-evoked DA concentration during a 2 s period following cue 
onset. Cue presentation on preferred and free-choice trials led to significantly larger increases 
in DA concentration than cue presentation on nonpreferred trials. (c) DA release during 
forced-choice risk trials separated by reward presentation or omission. Average lever press 
across animals at black triangle; line around black triangle shows minimum/maximum of 
average press. (d) DA concentration within 2 s following lever presentation. Unexpected 
presentation of reward during risk trials evoked a significant increase in DA compared to 
perfectly predicted safe trials while unexpected reward omission caused a significant 




Figure 7 Anatomical distribution of carbon fiber electrode placements. Coronal sections 
showing location of electrode tip during recording sessions in the NAc core and shell. 
Numbers to the right indicate distance anterior to bregma. Serial sections adapted from 
Paxinos and Watson (2005). 
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Figure 8 DA signaling in the NAc shell does not track subjective value during risky decision 
making. (a) Response allocation on free-choice trials averaged across the final two training 
sessions and the recording session for NAc shell animals. Dashed line represents indifference 
point. Each animal showed a significant preference for one of the reward (safe or risk) 
options. (b) Response latency for forced-choice trials during the recording session. Animals 
showed a significantly decreased response latency for the preferred versus nonpreferred 
lever. (c) DA concentration on forced–choice trials (separated by each animal’s behavioral 
preference) and free-choice trials aligned to cue onset (black bar, time 0s). (d) Peak cue-
evoked DA signal within 2 seconds of cue onset. There was no significant difference in cue-
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